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Abstract 
There is a growing body of literature on the rapidly expanding global fuel-ethanol 
industry but little understanding on the evolution of the structure and the dynamics of 
industrial governance. We employ a value chain analysis approach to examine the 
forces shaping the industry structure and inter-firm governance modes. Forty largest 
global and regional companies in the ethanol manufacturing stage have been selected. 
We classify the firms according to pre-entry industry of origin and study the vertical 
movement of these firms along the value chain. Firms with pre-entry history in 
feedstock supply have shown higher resilient to market shock especially compared to 
de novo firms, which is in line with observation by Klepper & Simons (2000).  
 
In addition, we observe a trend of dual-directional vertical integration. Firms 
backward integrate to secure feedstock supply; firms forward integrate to gain access 
to the retail market. On one hand, security of feedstock is a critical success factor of a 
fuel-ethanol manufacturer as it is a resource intensive industry with high cost 
exposure to feedstock. Another critical success factor for the industry is to gain 
control over the end user market via forward integration. Incumbent oil and gas firms 
currently dominate the fuel-ethanol retail market; ironically, fuel ethanol is the 
substitute of their product (i.e. gasoline). We propose that critical success factors are 
the important determinants of inter-firm governance mode rather than efficient based 
transaction cost or agency theory.   
Introduction  
The global bio-ethanol industry has expanded rapidly in the past decade, increasing at 
an average annual rate of 15%3. About 80% of the production is supplied to the 
                                                 
1 This paper is expected to be published in March 2011 in the Working Paper Series of Electricity Policy 
Research Group, Judge Business School & Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.  
2 Corresponding Author – jinhooi@gamil.com; PhD Candidate, Judge Business School, University of 
Cambridge 
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3 Calculated based on data estimated by F.O. Lichts as in Figure 3. 
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rapidly growing fuel-ethanol market and the rest is for the rather stable demand in 
the industrial and beverage sectors. Fuel-ethanol, as an additive/substitute for 
gasoline in Otto-cycle transport fuel market, is gaining substantial market share, 
especially in Europe, North and South America and reached about 6% of the global 
gasoline fuel market in 20094.  
 
Bio-ethanol, or biofuels in a broader sense, has attracted substantial research. There is 
a growing body of literature related to biofuels, which has been primarily preoccupied 
with policy instruments (Sorda et al., 2010; Balat & Balat, 2009), environmental 
impacts and greenhouse gas emission reductions (Searchinger et al., 2008; Kim et al., 
2009)), food and poverty interactions (FAO, 2009; Pfuderer & Castillo, 2008), and 
technology advances (Himmel and Bayer, 2009; Escobar et al., 2009; Balat et al., 
2008). Hitherto, there has been however no attempt to understand the evolution of 
the structure of this rapidly growing industry and the dynamics of industrial 
governance in a complex political economy landscape over time.  
 
We analyse the forces behind the evolution of the bio-ethanol industry by examining 
the dynamics along the entire value chain, with a particular focus on the core stage of 
ethanol manufacturing. The global bio-ethanol value chain can be divided into three 
distinct groups - the upstream agro-commodity stages, the midstream ethanol 
manufacturing stages, and downstream transport fuel stages. Three forces that shape 
the evolution of the structure of industry will be discussed in a greater detail, namely: 
(i) permeable industry boundaries, (ii) security of supplies and (iii) access to the retail 
market. These forces encourage a trend towards vertical integration as observed in 
recent development in the industry.  
 
The impact of permeability of industry boundaries has been observed by Fransman 
(2001) in the study of telecommunications industry. The permeability of boundaries 
can be seen in the ease of entry from neighbouring industries. There are many 
different types of industry players with different industry of origin and de novo firms 
entering the bio-ethanol industry at various stages along the value chain, especially in 
the manufacturing stage. These actors include engineering companies, major oil & gas 
firms, agro-food processors and agro-commodity traders. These companies have their 
respective competitive advantages in terms of resources and experience. Klepper & 
Simons (2000) have also observed the heterogeneity among entrants in terms of pre-
entry experience and background in television receiver industry.    
 
The second driving force is security of supply. There are two important supply points 
along the value chain - supply of feedstock for ethanol production and supply of 
ethanol for gasoline blending. The majority of ethanol manufacturers face substantial 
risks in feedstock supply and price volatility. In many countries, ethanol is neither the 
primary market nor large enough to have influence on pricing of major feedstock. This 
has created a propensity towards upstream integration in the industry, but the degree 
of integration from market to market has been strongly influenced by local and 
national political economy of feedstock production and supply markets. On the other 
hand, upstream integration to manufacturing stage in order to secure ethanol supply 
                                                 
4 Ethanol data based on estimation done by F.O. Lichts. Gasoline data from Euromonitor.  
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has been relatively easier and politically less sensitive. Therefore, a stronger wave of 
integration is observed in this stage.  
 
The third dynamic that shapes the industry structure is access to the retail market. 
There are three markets along the value chain. The first market is the market for 
feedstock. Feedstock producers and traders integrate downstream to ethanol 
manufacturing in order to create a stable market for their feedstock. It is also inline 
with the motivation of pursuing additional downstream rents. The other two markets 
– ethanol and retail fuel – are closely linked. The size of the ethanol market is linked to 
the size of retail fuel market, in particularly its ethanol component. There are mainly 
three stages - low blend (E5 or E10), mid blend (E15 to E25) and high blend (E85 or 
E100)5. The low blend market is highly regulated in all markets. Governments have 
created markets for ethanol blending with a specific blending ratio and consequently 
have limited the expansion of these markets by putting a cap on blending ratio. Table 
1 provides the main biofuels policy instrument for major producing and consuming 
countries/region and their respective blending market stages. The blending caps vary 
across countries and change over time, depending on the economics of oil market and 
agricultural & ethanol industry, political pressure from lobbying groups of industries 
and/or technical/design/emission issues of automobiles. In order to break through 
the cap set by the government and a market strangled by oil and gas industry, ethanol 
manufacturers integrate upstream to gain market access particularly in the high blend 
markets. It is a niche market where petroleum refiner has smaller market power and 
has not much interest to develop it.     
 
Strategic consideration as a basis of vertical integration has been suggested by Porter 
(1980) who wrote that firms employed vertical strategy to assure supply of inputs 
and market for outputs. Perry (1988:206) proposes that "assuring supply" should 
mean more than simply acquiring inputs at low prices or avoiding random 
fluctuations in price but include the ability to obtain imput at the prevailing input 
prices; and "assuring market" should mean much more than selling outputs at high 
prices but the ability of firm to sell a quantity of output at the prevailing output prices. 
We propose that "assuring supply" is a paramount factor in a resource base industry, 
especially during scarcity. And "accessing market" is a paramount factor when 
incumbent's product is to be substituted. 
 
This fast-growing ethanol industry with its special characteristics of crossover from 
agricultural value chain to energy value chain provides a different evolution patterns 
and dynamics in the formation of industrial structure. Working together with other 
political economy factors, these three fundamental forces have shaped the structure of 
bio-ethanol industry. We observe not only the creation of giant horizontally 
consolidated firms but also some evidence of increasing vertical integration.   
Table 1: Biofuel Policy and Blending Segments in Four Major Countries/Region 
                                                 
5 E denotes ethanol. E5 is a fuel with 5% ethanol content in gasoline. This low blend ethanol-gasoline is 
marketed to existing car mostly without any requirement for engine modification. Government regulates the 
percentage of blending and the quality to protect consumer’s right. High blend ethanol-gasoline, for example 
E85, serves a niche market – new car designed to run specifically for the blending ratio. There are a few 
countries with markets for mid-blending ratio of 15% to 25%.   
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No Country & Main Policy Instruments 
Blending 
Segment Remarks 
1 USA 
Energy Policy Act, 2005 and Energy 
Independence and Security Act, 2007: 
demands blending of renewable and set 
a target of 36 billion gallons of biofuels 
consumption by 2022. Each state has a 
quota to meet but do not specific 
mandatory blending requirements. 
Incentives: federal tax credit and import 
tariff as well as states specific subsidies.  
E10 Prior 1978 Energy Tax Act: for light 
duty motor vehicles 
E15 Approved by Environmental 
Protection Agency in Oct 2010 over oil 
industry objections for light duty 
motor vehicles manufactured in 2007 
and since.  
Approved in Jan 2011 for vehicle 
manufactured from 2001 to 2006. 
Up-to E85 For flexifuel car with small but 
growing market 
2 Brazil 
National Alcohol Program -Pró-Álcool, 
1975 & Federal Degree No.83, 
700/1979. 
 
Currently no subsidies provided to the 
ethanol industry but to small sugarcane 
producers in the poorer region of north-
northeast. Nevertheless, there are 
higher taxes on gasoline.  
 
Temporarily elimination of import tariff 
until end of 2011 - Resolution 
No.21/2010 of the Foreign Trade 
Chamber. 
E10-E22 Mandatory blending with varying 
ratios e.g. Petroleum National Council 
No. 144/1984, National 
Environmental Council Conama 
Resolution No.18/1986. 
E22 National Bill No.8, 723/1993, set the 
mandatory blending ratio nationwide 
E20-E25 
anhydrous 
ethanol 
Federal Degree No.3, 966/2001 allows 
varying ratios across country. 
E100 
hydrous 
ethanol  
Since 1979, running on special made 
engine 
Up-to 
E100 
For flexifuel car with aggressively 
growing market, ~70-90% new car 
sold in recent 5 years. 
3 EU 
Biofuels Directive 2003/03/EC - 
national indicative targets of 2% by the 
end of 2005 and 5.75% by the end of 
2010, based on energy content. 
Renewable Energy Directive, 
2009/28/EC - a mandatory target of 10 
% share of energy from renewable 
sources in transport by 2020. 
Differentiated tax regimes supporting 
biofuel to gasoline. Impose import tax 
for fuel-ethanol. 
5% v/v Directive 98/70/EC on the quality of 
petrol and diesel fuels. 
10% v/v Directive 2009/30/EC - regards the 
specification of petrol, diesel and gas-
oil and introducing a mechanism to 
monitor and reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
4 China 
The 10th Five-Year Plan (2001-05): 
Specific Project Development - initiated 
four fuel-ethanol plants to consume 
degraded government grain stockpiles. 
The 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-10): set 
targets at 5.22 million tonnes by 2010; 
15 million tonnes by 2020. 
The 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-05): 
target 1 million tonnes by 2015 
(expected). 
Pegged fuel-ethanol price to retail 
gasoline price and subsiding producers 
for losses. Import tax reduced from 30% 
to 5% in 2010.  
E10 Trial programme of E10 extended to 
fully in six provinces (Heilongjiang, 
Jilin, Shenyang, Henan, Anhui, 
Guangxi) and partially in another four 
provinces. 
Sources: Authors 
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In this paper, we first provide a description of the core stages in the value chain of the 
industry. The second section describes the degree of horizontal concentration in the 
ethanol manufacturing stage on a global scale. The top 30 manufacturers are ranked 
and their market shares are estimated. Concentration ratios are also calculated and 
discussed.  
 
Section three examines vertical integration of the top 30 global firms in the 
manufacturing stage. In addition, 10 other major regional or national firms in the 
value chain are also included in the analysis. We analyse the fundamental forces that 
shape the structure and the drivers of vertical integration in the industry.  
 
Finally, a discussion is offered to compare the empirical reality of the ethanol industry 
with the various theories of vertical integration. We propose that a wider perspective 
to include socio-political factors into the analysis of governance structure is important 
to understand the trends in this new and fast growing fuel-ethanol industry.  
 
Bio-ethanol Value Chain 
Bio-ethanol value chain is created by a crossover of two value chains, i.e. the agro-
commodity value chain and energy value chain as depicted in Figure 1. The upstream 
of the industry is the traditional agricultural value chain, which consists of three 
stages - the land, cultivation, and trading and transporting of agricultural produces. 
The midstream consists of ethanol manufacturers and traders. An auxiliary stage, 
which is not a stage along the main value chain, is also included to capture technology 
providers and other suppliers of production inputs such as chemicals, yeast, enzymes 
and utility. The downstream stages are similar to the downstream chains of 
conventional transport fuel, where ethanol is blended and distributed to retail fuel 
stations.    
 
 
Figure 1: Ethanol Value Chain: A crossover of Agro-commodity to Energy 
Sources: Authors 
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There are a several different agricultural feedstocks used for the production of bio-
ethanol. Table 2 shows the main feedstock used in major producing countries. The 
traditional feedstock are sugarcane molasses and beet molasses used in the 
production of beverage and industrial grades alcohol in many countries prior to the 
existence of fuel-ethanol market. But there is an increasing use of maize, sugarcane 
juice, wheat and cassava as many manufacturing facilities utilizing these feedstock 
were and are being built in the US, Brazil, EU and South East Asia.  
 
Table 2: Main Feedstock used in major Producing Countries 
No  Country/Region Main Feedstock
1 USA Maize 
2 Brazil Sugarcane, Sugarcane Molasses 
3 EU Beet, Beet Molasses, Wheat, Maize 
4 China Maize, Wheat, Sugarcane and Beet Molasses, Cassava 
5 India Sugarcane Molasses 
6 Canada Maize 
7 Thailand Sugarcane Molasses, Cassava 
8 Australia Sugarcane Molasses 
Sources: Authors 
 
The overall percentage of feedstock production used for bio-ethanol production has 
been relatively low compared to that for other uses as shown in Figure 2. Therefore, 
the ethanol market has a relatively weaker impact on the price of feedstock compared 
with other markets of the feedstock. For example, the sugar cane price is very much 
correlated with sugar price rather than ethanol price in many countries such as 
Thailand and the Philippines. And cassava price in Thailand is pegged to export 
market of cassava chip rather than the domestic ethanol price.  
 
Due to uncertainty in feedstock supply and price volatility, manufacturers are inclined 
to integrate upstream to mitigate risks. In the US, those manufacturers without a 
certain degree of upstream integration are susceptible to feedstock risk. For example, 
Verasun, once a leading ethanol manufacturer hedged maize in the future market. On 
31 October 2007, Verasun had to seek bankruptcy protection after a drop in the maize 
futures market. On the other hand, the other two top ethanol manufacturers - AMD 
and POET escaped the fate of Verasun by having had a stronger degree of integration 
upstream into trading and cultivation of maize. For example, ADM has a long history 
in agricultural commodity sector especially in sourcing and infrastructure. And POET 
works closely with farmers and farm cooperatives that have equity ownership in its 
ethanol plants. In these cases, firms with pre-entry experience in similar industry or 
supply chain has demonstrated to be more resilient as observed by Klepper and 
Simons (2000) in the U.S. television receiver industry. 
 
The midstream manufacturing stage is the core stage of the ethanol industry and it is 
the main indicator of growth in the industry. Figure 3 shows global bio-ethanol 
production from 1975 to 2009.  The total world ethanol production nearly tripled in 
the last decade, reaching 87.3 billion litres in 2007, increasing from 32.2 billion litres 
in 1988. The USA and Brazil are the two leading bio-ethanol producing countries with 
47% and 31% of global production respectively in 2009. Other major producing 
countries include European Union (6.8%), China (5.1%), India (2%), Canada (1.3%), 
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Thailand (0.8%), Columbia (0.4%) and Australia (0.3%). Production is expected to 
increase in the next few years not only in the USA and Brazil but also across many 
countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia. It is due to a large number of distilleries 
will be coming on stream in view of recent expansion in investment and markets 
driven by both favourable policies and its competitiveness as a gasoline substitute. 
 
 
Figure 2: Percentage of Utilisation of Feedstock In Ethanol Production 
Sources: Data from F.O. Licht’s 7(5), 2008 & FAO Online Statistics on Agricultural Products 2009 
 
F
igure 3: Global Bio-ethanol Production, 2009 
Sources: Date based on World Ethanol and Biofuels Report, 6(4) 2007 & 8(16) 2010 by F.O. Lichts. 
Note: Fuel ethanol production by countries in colour coded bars. The top series is the total global 
production of non-fuel ethanol. Data for non-fuel production prior to 1998 is not available. The above 
estimation is derived from extrapolation. 
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Figure 4 shows the market cycle of the bio-ethanol industry. It is currently in the 
Growth stage with a characteristic of a rapid increase in market penetration. 
Nevertheless, the potential for further growth depends on a number of factors, in 
particularly land and feedstock availability and costs. This is especially contentious for 
food based feedstock in long-term as the competition with food escalated and 
receiving heavy social political pressure. Other important factors that could induce or 
limit the growth of fuel-ethanol industry are the relative price of feedstock and oil, 
certainty in government policies, environmental sustainability requirements of these 
policies and any possible technological breakthrough in 2nd generation production 
technology, in particularly technology using non-food based feedstock. There are 
many government, research institutes and private companies have begun to invest 
heavily in 2nd generation fuel-alcohol research. Any breakthrough could have a 
disruptive effect on the production processes and feedstock requirements as well as 
pushing the market penetration of ethanol much further into the share of fossil 
gasoline. 
 
 
Figure 4: Bio-ethanol Market Cycle 
Source: Authors 
 
In the downstream stages, the majority of bio-ethanol produced is to supply the 
rapidly expanding fuel-ethanol market. In 2009, about 84% (73 billion litres) of bio-
ethanol was produced for fuel-ethanol market compared to 60% a decade ago. On the 
other hand, the beverage and industry markets are relatively stagnant, fluctuating 
between 13 and 16 billion litres as shown in Figure 3. 
 
Another feature of this industry is that the majority of fuel-ethanol produced serves 
domestic markets. Brazil as the main global exporter only exported 13% of the 25.2 
billion litres it produced in 2009. The two major importers are the US and EU. Other 
major importing countries are Japan, South Korea and Canada. This trend could 
change when more countries, especially China, open its market for import.  
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The bio-ethanol share in global oil supply was about 1.4% in 2009. For Otto-cycle 
transport fuel, ethanol contributed 5.7% by volume. The USA consumed 42,000 
million litres of fuel-ethanol, which was about 7.4% by volume of total motor gasoline, 
followed by Brazil (22,650 million litres), which amounted to over 55% by volume of 
total motor gasoline. The EU27, China, Canada and Thailand respectively consumed 
4,200, 1,700, 1,500 and 460 million litres as shown in Table 3.  
 
Fuel-ethanol is increasingly penetrating into gasoline markets as a substitute. Market 
share depends very much on government targets and mandates but it also varies with 
the relative price of ethanol to gasoline. There are other factors that could increase or 
be the barriers to the expansion of ethanol market share, which will be discussed in 
later sections.  
 
Table 3: Estimation of Ethanol Share in Otto-cycle Transport Fuel in 2009 
Country  Gasoline (million litres) Ethanol (million litres) % Ethanol by Vol. 
Global 1,227,000 74,443 5.7% 
USA 524,444 42,026 7.4% 
Brazil  18,462 22,650 55.1% 
EU 131,500 4,187 3.1% 
China 72,730 1,730 2.3% 
Canada 40,853 1,500 3.5% 
Thailand 7,063 460 6.1% 
Source: Gasoline data based on Euromonitor, Ethanol data based on US EIA & F.O. Lichts 
 
Horizontal Consolidation in the Ethanol Manufacturing Stage  
Over the last decade, there has been a strong trend towards merger and acquisition in 
the global ethanol manufacturing stage. We estimate the market concentration for the 
global ethanol manufacturing stage in order to identify top global and regional 
manufacturers. The global concentration ratios have also been calculated based on 
four-, eight- and twenty-firm ratios.   
 
The measure of market share is based on nameplate production capacity of each 
manufacturer. The production capacity of a manufacturer includes the capacity of all 
plants under its control or management. These include the design capacity at the year 
of interest, the capacity of new plant and expansion of existing plants under 
construction as of 2009.  
 
In the US, the difference between production and capacity share could be significant 
and with high volatility. For example there are idle plants especially those under 
bankruptcy administration. However, a firm's capacity (including near future capacity 
increase) is likely the best measure of its competitiveness because ethanol is an 
undifferentiated commodity (with the exception of differentiation by the criteria of 
sustainability & carbon emission reduction such as those stipulated in European 
Renewable Energy Directive). This is inline with the method used by U.S. Federal 
Trade Commission on calculating U.S. ethanol market concentration (FTC, 2009). For 
most plants, therefore, a firm's capacity has been used in the calculation but with an 
exception of Brazil.   
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In Brazil, a distillery is normally an integral part of a sugar mill. The manufacturer 
adjusts the ratio of production for sugar to ethanol based on price signals of both 
commodities. Therefore, a firm's plant capacity might not reflect the full picture as 
manufacturer switching between ethanol and sugar production. Therefore, we see 
that the actual production is a better parameter reflecting on the balancing act of 
manufacturer on ethanol vs. sugar. Therefore, the actual production data is used for 
Brazil.  
 
In addition, there is no data available on total global production capacity. The 
denominator of the measurement of concentration is based on the actual global 
production of bio-ethanol in 2009. Therefore, these estimates of market shares and 
concentration ratios are expected to be on the high side6.     
 
Table 4 shows the top 30 global bio-ethanol manufacturers in 2009. The top three 
manufacturers are all domestic American players, i.e. ADM, POET, and Valero, 
controlling 7.9%, 6.8% and 5.5% respectively of global market share. The American 
agribusiness giant, Archer Daniels Midland Co. (ADM) bought Minnesota Maize 
Processors, the then 3rd largest ethanol manufacturer in 2002, increasing its total 
annual capacity to 4.2 billion litres of ethanol. As a result of continued expansion and 
building new facilities, ADM was the largest manufacturer in the US (11%) and also 
the world (7.9%) in 2009. 
 
POET came second with 6.8%. Even through POET does not have controlling equity 
stake in all its name-plated distilleries, it expanded rapidly in the last five years 
especially in the number of distilleries it manages and the volume of ethanol it 
markets. Valero, the oil refiner, became the third largest manufacturer by acquiring 
assets from bankrupted firms, mostly those of Verasun in 2009.  
 
Some ethanol manufacturers operate across several regions. The best example is 
Abengoa Bioenergy, which has a significant presence in the manufacturing stage on 
the three most important continents for ethanol production and consumption i.e. USA, 
South America and Europe. The total installed capacity is expected to reach 4.1 billion 
litres by 2010. It was the 4th largest manufacturer in the world with a 5.5% market 
share in 2009.  
 
Cosan SA Industria e Comercio, the world’s largest sugarcane processor and the 
largest ethanol manufacturer in Brazil was in the 5th place globally with a 2.8% global 
share. As of 2009, Cosan owned 23 cane processing plants increased from 17 in 2007. 
The mills crushed 44.2 million tonnes of cane, about 10% of total Brazilian harvested 
in 2008/09 session. Cosan produced more than 2.4 billion litres of ethanol in 2009, up 
from 1.4 billion litres in 2007.  
 
                                                 
6 The data used is from publicly available information. The Renewable Fuel Association (RFA) of the 
USA publishes annual production capacity for each manufacturer, capacity expansion and new plant 
under construction. The Brazilian Sugarcane Industry Association (UNICA) publishes annual ethanol 
production of manufacturers in Brazil. Other sources of data include public announcements, industrial 
magazines, and manufacturers’ websites, which provide information on the capacities and 
expansion/construction plans of the company. 
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Table 4: Top 30 Global Manufacturers in 2009 (CR4=25.0, CR8=34.3, CR20=49.3) 
No Holding Company 
HQ 
Location 
Main Production
Location 
Production/Capacity 
(million litre/year) 
Global 
Share (%)
1 ADM USA USA 6,937 7.9% 
2 POET USA USA 5,957 6.8% 
3 Valero USA USA 4,806 5.5% 
4 Abengoa Spain USA/EU/Brazil 4,094 4.7% 
5 Cosan Brazil Brazil 2,468 2.8% 
6 Shree Renuka India Brazil/India 2,020 2.3% 
7 GPRE USA USA 1,860 2.1% 
8 ETH Bioenergia Brazil Brazil 1,748 2.0% 
9 Hawkeye USA USA 1,628 1.9% 
10 Bunge USA Brazil 1,486 1.7% 
11 Tereos France France/Brazil 1,415 1.6% 
12 Louis Dreyfus France Brazil 1,364 1.6% 
13 Andersons USA USA 1,066 1.2% 
14 White Energy USA USA 1,000 1.2% 
15 Pacific Ethanol USA USA 961 1.1% 
16 COFCO China China 925 1.1% 
17 Biofuel Energy USA USA 891 1.0% 
18 Tate&Lyle USA USA 814 0.9% 
19 Glacial Lake Energy USA USA 802 0.9% 
20 Aventine RE USA USA 802 0.9% 
21 Noble HK Brazil 800 0.9% 
22 Jian Shenghua CN CN 750 0.9% 
23 AltraBiofuels USA USA 711 0.8% 
24 Sudzecker Germany Germany 700 0.8% 
25 Sao Martinho Brazil Brazil 676 0.8% 
26 Cristal Union France France 650 0.7% 
27 Global Ethanol Australia USA 600 0.7% 
28 PedroAgroindustry Brazil Brazil 586 0.7% 
29 Moreno Brazil Brazil 569 0.7% 
30 Zilor Brazil Brazil 559 0.6% 
Note: Information and ranking is based on data and information as of March 2010.  
Source: Authors.  
 
Shree Renuka was in the 6th place with a 2.1% share after its acquisition of Group 
Equipav in Brazil on 21 Feb 2010. The second largest ethanol manufacturer in Brazil, 
ETH Bioenergy, was in the 8th place after GRPE (7th) of the USA. With continuous 
expansion and acquisition, ETH Bioenergy formed in the mid 2007 is expected to have 
ethanol production capacity up to 1.7 billion litres by 2012.  
 
International commodity giant, Bunge was in the 10th place after another US 
manufacturer, Hawkeye (9th). Bunge continues to expand with the acquisition of 
Moema Grupa on 11 Feb 2010. Two other international commodity giants, Tereos and 
Louis Dreyfus were in 11th and 12th places respectively after some acquisitions in 
Brazil.  
 
Globally, the four-firm concentration ratio was only at 25% suggesting there was little 
oligopolistic market power in international market. However, if consolidation trends 
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continue in the USA and Brazil, there is a possibility that fuel-ethanol production 
giants will be created, which will have significant global market power. 
 
Vertical Integration in the Ethanol Industry 
From the list of top manufacturer, we noticed that their pre-entry backgrounds are 
very diverse. They come from not only agricultural and fossil fuel chains but also 
technology companies and de novo firms of new entrepreneurial start-ups as 
illustrated in Figure 5.    
 
We investigate the degree of vertical integration and drivers of the changes in the bio-
ethanol industry structure by examining 30 largest global manufacturers. In order to 
capture specific aspects of the integration trends, an additional 10 players in the value 
chain has also been selected. They are either major regional manufacturers or oil and 
gas corporations with a certain degree of involvement in the bio-ethanol chain. 
 
 
Figure 5: Pre-entry Background of Global Ethanol Manufacturers 
Sources: Authors 
 
In addition to the origin industry of the manufacturers, their vertical involvement in 
the bio-ethanol value chain is also investigated. These forty firms have been 
categorised into five main groups and colour coded based on their pre-entry 
background as in Table 5. These five main groups are:  
i) Group 1: Technology, engineering and construction firms; 
ii) Group 2: Farmer & farmer cooperatives and Agro-food & Sweetener 
Manufacturers. They are firms with a long history in food/sweetener 
production, and some in ethanol production as well; 
iii) Group 3: Agriculture commodities traders. Their main activities are sourcing 
and market agriculture commodities, but some firms have diversified 
extensively or have been involved in food processing industry for a long time; 
iv) Group 4: De novo entrepreneurial start-ups with minimal or no background in 
the biofuel supply chain; and 
v) Group 5: Oil and Gas firms and downstream marketers of motor gasoline.  
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Table 5: Pre-Entry History and Vertical Involvement of Top Global Players in 
Bio-Ethanol Value Chain, 2009 
 Source: Authors. Data from manufacturers’ websites, RFA & UNICA statistics. 
 
The columns in Table 5 represent stages of ethanol value chain. The first two columns 
are for auxiliary stages of 1st and 2nd generation technology suppliers. The agro-food 
processing column does not belong to the fuel-ethanol value chain. It is included to 
show the industry of origin of some players.   
 
Note：Colour Code 
 Engineering and construction company who builds plants and supplies technology 
 
Farmer/farmer cooperative and Agro-food processor, with a long history in sweetener 
production 
 Global/National agro-commodity trader
 De novo entrepreneurial start-up with minimum or no background in the supply chain
 Oil & Gas company, either integrated or in downstream business
 
Firms with liquidity problem and in financial stress during the after map of 2007 financial 
crisis. They were either in insolvency or in the process of debt restructuring 
 Involvement in a stage of the ethanol value chain
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In Table 5, these cells shaded in the colour of the corresponding firm denote the 
historical activities of the firm. Whereas, cells shaded in green indicate new business 
activities along the value chain that the firm is involved in. 
 
We observe that Group 1-Engineering firms, are not only involved in R&D on 2nd 
generation technology but have also expanded vertically into the manufacturing and 
other downstream activities of the value chain. The most vertically integrated firm in 
this group is Abengoa, which comes from an engineering & construction sector 
background, building distilleries all over the world. On the other hand, some ethanol 
manufacturers have also venturing into this auxiliary stage. In the USA, POET and 
ADM both design and build their own distilleries. A newcomer into this stage is Shree 
Renuka of India, which is a sugar-ethanol company that has operating units in both 
India and Brazil. In 2007, it acquired KBK, an engineering and construction company 
based in India, which builds distilleries throughout Asia.  
 
The firms with food processing background in Group 2 have been involved heavily in 
the ethanol manufacturing stage. They have a natural competitive advantage because 
of a long history of knowhow in feedstock processing and sourcing. Firms in Group 2 
enjoy a high level of security of feedstock supply. There are only a few of these firms 
integrating further into downstream stages. For example, Cosan is the most vertically 
integrated ethanol firm in the world as seen by its involvement in every stage along 
the sugarcane-based ethanol value chain. In 2007, Cosan acquired ExxonMobil’s 
downstream operation in Brazil. In early 2010, it announced the signing of an MOU 
with Shell to form a giant ethanol group in Brazil.  
 
Similarly leveraging their pre-entry knowledge in feedstock supply and market 
capability, firms in Group 3, such as agricultural commodity traders, farmers and 
farmer cooperatives, have also ventured into the ethanol industry. They are primarily 
active in the manufacturing and marketing stages but shied away from the 
downstream blending, distribution and retailing businesses.  
 
In Group 4, de novo firms are new start-ups with generally little corporate background 
in the ethanol and related industry. They entered the market because of favourable 
government policies in ethanol manufacturing and use as transport fuel. Some firms 
have moved extremely quickly to expand horizontally by raising equity in the stock 
market or from private equity funds. Many of these firms in both the USA and Brazil 
have expanded too quickly and began to face liquidity problems during the 2007 
global financial crisis such as Pacific Ethanol, Panda Ethanol and Renew Energy in the 
US. A few firms in the USA have also employed a vertical integration strategy 
especially into downstream in order to gain market access. For example, GPRE 
acquired Blendstar to penetrate into downstream blending and distribution markets. 
Before going into bankruptcy, Verasun Energy was the largest ethanol manufacturer 
with 11 operational plants and another 6 new plants in construction or under 
development. Verasun blended and marketed its own brand of E85 ethanol to 150 
retailing stations across 15 states.        
  
The final group is oil and gas corporations. Many corporations with downstream 
gasoline businesses have to comply with national policies on ethanol blending and 
have therefore become involved in the value chain. Oil and gas firms have diverse 
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interests in moving upstream along the ethanol value chain. Their involvement in 
sourcing and trading ethanol has been very substantial already. For example, 
Greenergy, claimed to be the top UK’s road fuel supplier and have a 20% market 
share, is also one of the largest ethanol suppliers in the UK with extensive upstream 
sourcing and logistic capabilities. Shell and BP have been moving and trading large 
quantities of ethanol globally. BP has also claimed that it has blended and distributed 
2.89 and 0.34 billion litres of fuel-ethanol in 2007 respectively in the USA and Europe, 
which in total is about 6.5% of the world’s downstream market share in 2007. In 
2008, BP has also committed to purchase and market 103 million litres of fuel-ethanol 
in Australia. On the other hand, Shell claimed to distribute more than 5 billion litres of 
ethanol in 2007. Total and Statoil have also marketed ethanol blended fuel in their 
respective domestic markets.  
 
In addition, these firms have shown interest in moving further upstream into the 
manufacturing of ethanol and supplying of feedstock. BP has invested in two major 
greenfield projects in Brazil and a 420 million litres distillery joint venture with 
British Sugar and Du Pont in the UK. BP is expected to have a total installed capacity of 
1.42 billion litres if all its projects materialised. On the other hand, Shell has taken a 
big step in the proposed JV with Cosan. Valero, one of the largest refiners in the USA, 
has invested substantially in ethanol production units and disposing some of its 
petroleum refining facilities (Valero, 2010). In 2009, it was the third largest ethanol 
manufacturer in the USA and the world. The oil and gas giants have also heavily 
invested7 in R&D of various 2nd generation technologies in bio-alcohol fuels with JV 
and acquisition of some biotech firms.   
  
Drivers of evolution in ethanol industry structure 
The bio-ethanol industry is not a new industry but rather one with a long history of 
serving the beverage and industrial markets. Nevertheless, fuel-ethanol industry is a 
rather new in many countries and firms. Rent-seeking actors venture into this new 
and rapidly growing market trying to occupy and extracting rents along the ethanol 
value chain. It should also be noted that firms predominantly operate in downstream 
are integrating upstream and vice versa. The bi-directional movement contradicts 
assumption that firms seek to occupy the highest rent stage in the value chain.  
 
Downstream integration into the manufacturing stage by engineering firms, 
traditional food processors and commodity traders could be understood by taking a 
resource-based view. The strategic resources available to the firm could be utilised by 
the firm to gain long-term competitive advantage (Wernerfelt, 1984). The firm utilises 
its resources, e.g. technological knowhow or feedstock supply, to develop a new line of 
businesses in an expanding market.  
 
Based the analysis above, we propose that the primary factor that motivates ethanol 
manufacturing firms to integrate upstream is for security of supply for feedstock. 
Security of supply is in terms of quantity required as well as at a stable price. As 
shown in Figure 2, various feedstocks for ethanol production have their existing 
markets, which are far larger. Ethanol manufacturer is a price taker in most of the 
market conditions.  
                                                 
7 Accurate estimation is difficult because acquisition cost is normally not fully disclosed.  
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However, there are socio-economy and political aspects of integration in upstream 
cultivation stages, which might incentivise or prohibit integration. Land rights and 
ownership structure in a specific country are important factors that shape the 
governance structure of this stage. For example, there are land ownership restrictions 
based on whether the actor is an individual or corporation, local or foreign, when 
seeking control of a large piece of land for cultivation. But these restrictions are less 
stringent, for example in Brazil, compare with those in countries such as China, the 
Philippines and Indonesia.  
 
In the cultivation stage, type of crop is an important factor. Some crops require 
substantial input such as seeds, fertiliser and pesticides. Other such as cassava 
requires only one off seeding purchase and the next planting material is obtained 
from previous harvesting. Dependency on substantial farm inputs and credits could be 
a factor for integration in this stage. But, on the other hand, farm size, farm 
management, and farm labour will also have a significant impact on how and whether 
upstream integration may happen. For example, high number of small size family 
farms in cassava cultivation in central Thailand makes equity or even contract farming 
prohibitive when ethanol manufacturer attempts to integrate upstream. On the other 
hand, the traditional sugar-ethanol industry in Brazil owns a substantial portion of 
their sugarcane land or in long-term contracts with large farmers.  
 
However, upstream integration into the feedstock production stage by oil and gas 
firms is not yet prevalent. Most oil and gas firms are not familiar with the traditional 
agricultural sector or agricultural commodity markets. BP and Shell chose to invest in 
the producing stage in Brazil rather than the USA, which might be attributable to 
sugarcane based ethanol delivering more environmental and carbon emission 
reduction benefits than their maize-based counterpart in the USA. Nevertheless, one 
of the crucial factors is due to a lesser concern on security of supply of sugarcane. The 
risk could be more easily mitigated because of site-specificity of cane due to its 
bulkiness. 
 
Moreover, upstream integration of oil and gas firms into manufacturing stage will of 
course enhance security of supply of ethanol, as the firms are required to fulfil 
regulatory targets. On the other hand, firms in the refining sector without upstream 
oil and gas exploration business are also moving out of this increasing lower margin 
business. This type of firm is venturing into a new substitute, ethanol, and seeking 
rents in this new industry. A typical example is Valero. Other gasoline refiners and 
distributors, which have been moving upstream to source and market blended 
products, include Suncor in the USA, and Greenergy in the UK.    
   
On the other hand, the price of gasoline does have some bearing on the price of 
ethanol in particular in the US market (CBOT futures prices of ethanol and gasoline). 
Manufacturer’s margin could be squeezed with a high feedstock price but a low 
ethanol price. In most countries, with notable exception of Brazil, these stages are 
dominated by the downstream oil and gas businesses. Ethanol volume is relatively 
small compared to gasoline in the overall blending. As petroleum refining capacity in 
excess in most parts of the world, refiners are generally reluctant to pursue ethanol 
blending and putting barriers on government’s aspiration to mandate any blending. 
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For example, oil and gas firms struggled with excess refining capacity and were non-
cooperative with the Japanese government in pilot rollouts of ethanol programme in 
the 2000s. Ethanol manufacturers such as SEKAB in Sweden and Verasun in the USA 
have integrated downstream, especially into the higher blend market stage that might 
over the long-term provide a solution to the above situation.  
 
In our analysis, we observe that there have been a substantial number of entries from 
neighbouring industries indicating ethanol industry boundaries are highly permeable. 
This permeability has created a structure where groups of firms with diverse pre-
entry industry backgrounds and resources compete at various stages along the value 
chain.  
 
In summary, our analysis shows four phenomena of integration along the value:  
1) Backward integration of manufacturers to farming/commodity trading. This is less 
prevalent in both the US and Brazil. Barriers of entry could be too high including 
capital requirements, skills, and land acquisitions.  
 
2) Backward integration of oil & gas firms into manufacturing of ethanol is increasing 
but lagging, possibly due to inertia or mismatch between the set of organisational 
skills required (Teece at al., 1997) for conventional operations (in oil and gas, 
especially upstream activities) and those of the new venture (agro-business), 
including different in investment scale and expected returns, inexperience in 
agricultural commodity markets, agricultural management and social political aspects 
of agricultural activities.    
 
Nevertheless, we noticed a large-scale entry by Valero, the largest independence 
crude refiner in the US into the manufacturing stage. Other refiners in the US do entry 
but in a smaller scale. There is a better overlap of skill sets between refiner and 
ethanol manufacturer compared with most of the upstream exploration orientated oil 
and gas companies.  
 
3) Forward integration of commodity traders and farmer/cooperatives into 
manufacturing is very prevalent. Entrants with some pre-entry history in the value 
chain as (Klepper & Simons, 2000) are noted in countries such as the US, Brazil, China, 
France, Thailand and Vietnam. These de alio firms are more resilient in facing supply 
risks compared with de novo new start-ups. In addition, experience increased the 
value of entry as well as encouraging entry into new markets (King & Tucci, 2002). In 
addition, de novo firm survival rate is expected to be lower than de alio (Geroski, 
1995; Helfat & Lieberman, 2002). 
 
Nevertheless, it must be much more than having 'leveragable' asset of dynamic 
competencies (Teece & Pisano, 1994) or a bundle of skills and technologies (Hamel & 
Prahalad, 1994). As downstream oil and gas firms are backward integrated and 
upstream commodity traders are forward integrated, which are the keys capability for 
performance and survival?  
 
4) There are good examples of forward integration of manufacturers into marketing, 
blending, distribution/retail. We also observe that firms of de novo and upstream de 
alio nature integrate further forward to marketing, blending, distribution/retail. As 
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Perry (1988:206) has suggested that the one of the motivations for firm to employ 
vertical integration strategy is not only to secure the market for its product but also to 
gain the ability to sell the quantity of output the firm would wish. This factor appears 
to be significantly important in the instant of the market being controlled by 
incumbents that their very product is to be substituted.  
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Coase (1937) argued that firms and markets are mutually substitutable governance 
mechanisms. Transactions will be organised within a firm that is vertically integrated 
when the cost of doing so is lower than the cost involved in using the markets. 
Developing from this concept, the transaction cost economists such as Klein et al. 
(1978) and Williamson (1979) suggests that due to the prohibitive cost of contracting, 
firm tends to integrate vertically especially there exist asset specificities. This 
propounds that the choice of governance structure is a decision based on the aim to 
achieve higher efficiency.  
 
On the other hand, Bain (1956, 1959) proposed from an industrial organisation 
perspective that a firm only expands horizontally or vertically in order to respond to 
external market power or to create and exploit market power.  But, Joskow (2005), 
agreeing with transaction cost perspective, proposed that there was substantial 
support in the empirical literature for various efficiency motivations compared to a 
lesser support for market power exploitation as motivations in choosing vertical 
integration approach to inter-firms governance.  
 
Some studies in strategic management literature (e.g. Van de Vrande et al., 2009; 
Argyres, 1996), however, have shown that strategic factors are important 
considerations for manager during the selection of governance modes. Nevertheless, 
we propose that strategic factor particularly critical success factor of an industry 
should be taken into consideration when analysing determinants of governance mode. 
However, our analysis of the ethanol industry indicates that two important strategic 
forces shape the dynamic of ethanol industrial structure i.e. security of feedstock 
supply and access to retail market. It has to be acknowledged that the growing ethanol 
industry is a considerably tiny in both feedstock and fuel markets. Ethanol 
manufacturers have to compete for feedstock supply with a much larger and more 
mature food industry and ethanol manufacturers have to fight for market share as a 
substitute for gasoline in the downstream distribution/retail stages dominated by 
“supermajor” integrated oil companies.  
 
Another dynamic force that curves the evolution of the structure of the industry is the 
permeability of the industry boundaries. Due to ease of entry and the absence of 
major technological barriers, not only neighbouring industries with specific 
competitive advantages but also de novo new start-ups entered the manufacturing 
sector. Successful firms, that possess resources and distinctive competencies such as 
capital, technology, specialised skills, organisational culture and knowledge from their 
original operation, could leverage these pre-entry assets into other markets and 
industries. (Teece & Pisano, 1994; Carroll et al., 1996). We observe that firms with 
prior industry experience do have higher resilient to shock and is expected to perform 
better as theory on "dominance by birthright" propounded by Klepper & Simons 
(2000). But, the question remains on which are the critical pre-entry capabilities of a 
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firm affecting performance and ultimate exit. Nevertheless, for fuel-ethanol industry, 
the structure may change dramatically when 2nd generation technology becomes 
available.  
 
As also demonstrated above, there are social and political factors that prohibit or 
influence a firm’s decision in vertical integration. Firms in some countries do not 
integrate upstream to agriculture production and land ownership because of social-
political factors. It is due to neither the absence of substantial rents in the stage nor 
market arrangement does not increase transaction costs. Any analysis of the 
governance structure has to take account of a wider perspective including the 
environment and social-political factors in terms of regulation on land ownership, 
rural social structure, and farm size and practices.  
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